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Individual transferable quotas system is widely regarded as the best fishery management regime.   
The literature, however, has ignored the consequence of this managerial system when 
implemented in an economy where fishermen are both producer and consumer of its own harvest.   
This article analyzes the behavior of fishing households based on the household model when 
individual transferable quota system is introduced under missing labor market.   It is shown that 
the individual transferable quotas system could adversely redistribute the quotas through quotas 
trade and thus cause social inefficiency. 
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Individual transferable quota is a property rights-based fishery management regime that have 
been implemented in many fisheries in several countries, such as New Zealand, Australia, Canada, 
Iceland, and USA.  The structure of the regime is much analogous to that of pollution permit 
system: it limits the total harvest in the form of total allowable catch (TAC), and a share of TAC 
is allocated to each harvester as a quota.  Quotas can be traded among harvesters in the quota 
market.  Theoretically, the price of quota will reflect all or some of externalities caused by the 
common-pool nature of fishery resources and thus are internalized by harvesters. 
  There are widespread literatures on individual transferable quotas, generally regarding it 
as the best management regime among others in terms of efficiency, i.e., maximizing the net 
return from the fishery (Arnason).  There are literatures discussing the issues which individual 
transferable quotas might not be efficient, such as the case of high-grading (Anderson) and 
production externalities (Boyce).  Nevertheless, it is often argued that although the individual 
transferable quotas do not lead to the first-best outcome, it is the best management regime in the 
sense that it results in a superior outcome among others available and/or currently practiced 
regimes (Grafton). 
  These literatures, however, treat fishery as an industry and fishermen and/or vessel 
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owners as merely a producer of the commodity.  What seems to be missing in the literature is 
the analysis of the impact of individual transferable quotas when fishermen are not just a 
producer but also a consumer of his own harvest.  In developing countries, many fishermen are 
both producer and consumer of his own harvest.  The issues of over-exploitation of fish stock 
are also prevalent in these countries (Asian Development Bank), indicating clearly that some 
regime of fishery management is necessary.    The question is: will individual transferable quotas 
work in fisheries in such developing countries, as it does in developed countries? 
  The analyses of a household, i.e., an economic entity that is both a producer and 
consumer of its own production, can be found in the literature of agricultural development 
economics.  There are both theoretical grounds and empirical evidences where households 
behave differently from being a pure producer (Finkelshtain and Chalfant, , Singh, Squire and 
Strauss).  Furthermore, in the presence of imperfect markets, which is prevalent in developing 
countries, it is shown that the behavior of a peasant household is different from what one might 
expect as rational (de Janvry, Fafchamps and Sadoulet). 
  This article analyzes the behavior of fishing households based on the household model 
introduced by Singh, Squire and Strauss (1986).  First analysis is under the assumption that all 
markets are perfect.  In this case the individual transferable quotas system yield a first-best 
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outcome: it will induce a redistribution of quota in such a way that more productive household 
will acquire additional quota while less productive household will sell some of its initially 
allocated quota.  Second analysis considers the existence of labor market imperfection.  An 
important result shown in this case is that there exists a possibility that the individual transferable 
quotas system will adversely redistribute the quotas: transfer from more productive household to 
less productive household.  In such case the transferability of quotas could potentially cause 
negative effects on social welfare. 
  There are issues, although intellectually interesting, which this article will not cover.  
First, market imperfection is not limited to labor market; however this article will not consider 
other types of market imperfection.  Other forms of market imperfection include missing credit 
market, insurance market, other marketed goods, and so on.  Second, uncertainty and risk are 
not considered in the analyses.    These aspects are left for future research. 
  The organization of this article is as follows.  In the next section, the household model 
under perfect markets assumption is analyzed.    The results derived in this section will serve as a 
benchmark.  Next section analyzes the consequence of individual transferable quotas under 




Three goods are considered in the household model.  One is the fish, which a household 
harvests as production activity and also consumes.  Second  good  is  leisure.  Each  household  is 
assumed to have a certain endowment of time,  i T , which it allocated between leisure and labor.  
Third good is other marketed goods, which essentially includes everything else that a household 
consumes other than fish and leisure.    Markets for these goods are assumed to be perfect. 
  Other assumptions are as follows.    Firstly, utility function of each household is concave 
in all goods, twice differentiable, and satisfies local non-satiation.  Secondly, production (or 
harvest) is assumed to be a function of two inputs: labor and capital.    The level of capital input, 
however, is assumed to be fixed
１.  I assume production function to be concave in inputs and 
twice differentiable.  Thirdly, this article will not get into how the initial allocation of quotas 
should be done, but rather treats the initial allocation as given.  It is also assumed that initial 
quotas were granted at no cost to each fishing household. 
 
Perfect market 
In this basic model all markets exist and are perfect.    All prices are fixed and exogenous for all 
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Subscripts  ,  , and    denotes fish, other market goods that households do not produce, and 
leisure, respectively.    is the consumption of household i of good j, and   is the market 
price of good j.  Other prices involved are wage rate and quota price, which are denoted as   











i K ).     is the household labor supply and hence the term  i F i i F L −  defines hired labor.  
i T  is time endowment defined as average on-activity hours per person times the number of 
working household members.   i q  is the initial quotas allocated to a household i (exogenous 
variable), and   is the amount of quotas a household i possesses after the trade (choice 
variable).  
i q
i π   is the profit of a household i. 
  Lagrangian can be written as: 
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Kuhn-Tucker first order necessary conditions are: 
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Following proposition can be derived from these FOCs, which will be useful in our later 
analyses. 
 Proposition: If total harvest quota constraint is binding and quota market price is 
exogenous, then at optimum each household will equate its harvest level and amount of quota it 
possesses. 
 Proof: First consider the case where each household does not equate its harvest level and 
amount of quota it possesses at optimum, i.e.   for  all  i.    From equation (6), this implies 
that 
i i q h ≠
*
0 = i µ , which then leads to  0 = s , i.e. quota price is zero, from equation (5).  This will 




i h q Q
~
, where  i h
~
  is the optimal 
harvest level of household i before the introduction of quotas
２.  Now consider the case where 
the total quota constraint is binding.  If this is the case then  , and from equation (5)  0 > s
0 > i µ  for  all i must hold
３, and then equation (6) implies that   for  all  i.  i i q h =
*
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  Notice that the required equality is   and not  i i q h =
*
i i q h =
* .  The process of 
decision-making would be to determine the harvest level first by observing exogenous market 
prices and then adjust its quota holdings via quota trade. 
  In this basic model, the level of harvest will be determined through optimal choice of 













Assuming  s p f >
４, equation (7) determines the optimal level of labor input.  Optimal harvest 
level,  ( ) i i h
* = i i K L h ,
* , is then determined. 
 With  i h   determined, we can now turn to the quota market.    Recall that at optimum the 
condition   must hold.  The decision rule is if 
*
i q = i h
*
i i q h >
*  then purchase additional quota 
from the market, and if  i i q h <
*   then sell excess quota to the market. 
  Following two-agent example will illustrate how individual transferable quotas system 
works.  Suppose there are two households A and B.  Household A has lower productivity of 










.  Assume further that initial 
quotas are distributed equally ( B A q q = ), both have same capital inputs ( K K K B A ≡ = ), and 
household A has more time endowment than B ( B A T > T )
５. Otherwise two households are 
identical. 
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  Since prices are exogenous and fixed, the right-hand side of equation (7) is 
predetermined, and the left-hand side of the equation is then determined independently from the 
current amount of quotas in possession.  Therefore, in general  i i q h ≠
*   ex ante.  Furthermore, 















must hold, which 
implies  A B LL <  and  thus 
**
A B hh < . 
  Suppose initial allocation was such that household A has more than its optimal level and 
household B has less than its optimum; i.e.  A A q h <
*  and  B B q h >
* .    If there was no quota market 
household A is wasting its excess quotas that have some positive value and household B is not 
utilizing its productivity to the fullest, and inefficiency prevails.  If quota market exists then 
household B will purchase quotas from household A
６ and achieve an efficient outcome as a 
whole; i.e., equation (7) is satisfied for both households.  Lastly, with optimal harvest level 
determined, the budget constraint is set.  The level of consumption is then determined by the 
first order conditions with respect to each consumption good. 
  Note that here we solved the profit maximization and utility maximization problems 
simultaneously, but it is easy to verify that the same result can be obtained by maximizing profit 
first and then maximizing the utility.    This implies that the problem is recursive; i.e. the decision 
on consumption of goods does not influence the production decision.  In this case, results from 
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treating a fisherman as a household or as a mere producer yield no difference. 
 
 
Figure 1. Quotas redistribution and optimal harvest level under perfect markets 
 
Labor market imperfection 
In this section I impose a market constraint that a fishing household can neither hire outside labor 
nor send its family labor to non-fishing jobs.  A household could face such a constraint if labor 
market do not exist, or it exists but a household decided not to participate due to factors such as 
high transaction cost.  The definition of market imperfection is not commodity specific but 
household specific (de Janvry, Fafchamps and Sadoulet), and therefore the labor market 
constraint can exist much more common than one might expect. 
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Note that labor cost term in the profit equation has dropped out, and all labor input Li is supplied 
by family labor, Fi.  Lagrangian  is  defined  as: 
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Kuhn-Tucker first order necessary conditions are: 
(9)   : 
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Assume total amount of quotas is binding, so that from proposition we have   for all 
household.    From equations (11) and (12) we obtain: 

















ω ≡  at  optimum. 
  i ω  can be interpreted as household-specific shadow wage or marginal shadow value of 
time.  The  level  of  i ω   can differ among households depending on their marginal utility of time 
( i γ ), which in turn is affected partially by the endowment of time ( i T ).  Notice that this 
household utility maximization problem is no longer recursive as we saw in the previous section.   
Optimal harvest level, and hence the optimal labor input level, is partially determined by the level 
of  i ω .  But  i ω  is endogenous that is affected by the household’s decision on leisure 
consumption.    There is a feedback flow from consumption decision to production decision. 
  This leads to a possibility that, for some level of  i ω , less productive household 
purchases quota from more productive household.  This is illustrated in figure 2 with the same 
two-agent model presented in previous section.  From equation (14), the optimal harvest level 





.  Since household A 
has more time endowment ( B A T > T ) by assumption, shadow wage will be lower than that of 








, ceteris paribus.  As shown in figure 2, 
less productive household A purchases additional quota ( A q hA −
* ) while more productive 
household B sells quota (
* h − B B q ). 
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  The result depicted in figure 2 is not the only possible outcome for the case of missing 
labor market.  Which outcome prevails depend on the relative degree of household-specific 
shadow wage, which itself is affected by various attributes.   Whether such outcome as in figure 
2 prevails is an empirical issue.    It is important, nevertheless, to acknowledge the downside risk 
of implementing the individual transferable quotas system in the presence of missing labor 
market.    Some discussions on this matter are presented in the conclusion. 
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Figure 2. Quotas redistribution and optimal harvest level missing labor market 
 
Conclusion 
Using a simple household model, I have shown that under the labor market imperfection the 
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individual transferable quotas system could transfer the quotas from more productive household 
to less productive household.  This is the opposite of what many literatures on individual 
transferable  quotas  indicate.  This  article  showed  that same efficient result can be obtained with 
the household model under the assumption that all markets are perfect.  Thus, whether the 
individual transferable quotas system would function as expected depends on the market 
environment surrounding that particular targeted region. 
  What are the effects of quotas being adversely redistributed?    We know that the trade is 
beneficial for both fishing households; no household will engage in the trade if they know that 
their welfare will diminish after the trade.    Thus, if any negative effects exist due to quotas trade 
under the missing labor market, it must be in the form of externalities outside the concerns of 
households. 
  One possible negative effect is the waste of resources.  In the model, I assumed only 
one variable input, namely labor, but in reality there are multiple inputs for harvesting.  As less 
productive fishing household expands (or maintain at higher level of) harvesting, more inputs are 
committed than what it would have been under the perfect markets case.    This could be either in 
physical material resource, such as trees for boats or gasoline to operate the boats, or in financial 
resource, or both.  Assuming markets other than labor market are perfect, these extra inputs 
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could have been diverted to other and potentially more efficient use. 
  As aforementioned, the model implies that the occurrence of such adverse redistribution 
of quotas is one of the possibilities when individual transferable quotas system is implemented 
under market imperfection.  Whether or not it actually occurs is an empirical issue, which is 
specific to the targeted region.  The implication of this article is that, because there is this 
possibility of adverse redistribution of quotas, one can no longer claims that the individual 
transferable quotas system is the first-best solution to fishery management in any regions and/or 
cases.  When the existence of market imperfection is suspected a careful assessment of the 
consequence of implementing the individual transferable quotas is critical, and in some cases 






１ In the context of fisherman household in a developing country, it is plausible to 
assume that capital inputs, such as boats and gears, are fixed in the short-run. 
 
２ Notice  that q  for ∀   is sufficient, but not necessary for   to  occur.  i i h
~
≥ i 0 = s
s p f ≤
 
３ Recall that the quota price is fixed and faced by all households, as assumed in this 
model. 
 
４ If   then every household will find profitable (or indifferent if equality holds) 
to sell off their quota rather than harvesting, and hence there would be no fishing activities. 
 
５  For example, household A has more working-age family member than household B. 
 
６  Quota supplied and demanded must equalize from the fact that total quota being set is 
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